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The United States is alone among major industrialized nations in
not having a universal guarantee of insurance coverage for its citizens.
As a result, over 43 million Americans are currently uninsured, includ-
ing over 10 million children.  But this large uncovered population
should not be taken to indicate that the U.S. government does not inter-
vene in the market for health insurance to help those unable to obtain
coverage.  On the contrary, the single fastest growing federal entitle-
ment program over the past decade is the Medicaid program, which
provides health insurance coverage for low-income populations.  In
1988, federal Medicaid expenditures were $54 billion; by 1998, expen-
ditures had grown by almost 400 percent to $184 billion.  But over this
same period, the fraction of the non-elderly population without insur-
ance coverage actually rose by almost 20 percent.1
 The fact that this rapid growth in the Medicaid program has not
checked the growth in the uninsured highlights the limitations of cur-
rent public insurance policy as a means of guaranteeing universal
access to the health care system.  However, with universal coverage
effectively erased from the policy horizon, partial solutions to the
accessibility problem (such as the Medicaid program) are likely to be
the alternative of choice for dealing with this problem in the near
future.  Indeed, since the failure of President Clinton’s ambitious health
insurance reform plan, government policy in this area has focused on
incremental reforms.  The two most important reforms of the past five
years have been the expansion of public health insurance for children
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through the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and regula-
tory reforms of the private health insurance market through the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).  Recently,
attention has turned to a third option—expanding tax subsidies for
health insurance coverage.
In this chapter I will review the important health policy issues
involved with different incremental routes to coverage of the uninsured
in the United States.  Then, after reviewing the facts about insurance
coverage in the United States,  I discuss what we have learned from the
past 15 years of expansion of the Medicaid program, our traditional
source of insurance coverage for indigent populations.  The “Policy
Directions” section contains a detailed analysis of the alternative direc-
tions that might be taken in expanding health insurance coverage in the
United States: expanding the public insurance safety net up the income
scale, filling in the gaps in the existing public insurance safety net,
reforming the insurance market to increase access to private market
policies, expanding limited mandates on employers, and using tax sub-
sidies to induce expanded private coverage.  The final section provides
a brief summary.
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES
While the elderly population is almost universally covered by the
Medicare program, there are five primary insurance categories for the
U.S. non-elderly population.  These categories and how they have
changed over time are shown in Table 1.  The primary insurance cate-
gory is coverage through the workplace, through which 64 percent of
the non-elderly population obtain insurance coverage.  Another 7 per-
cent of the population obtains insurance coverage through other private
insurance, primarily purchased in the nongroup insurance market.  The
primary remaining source of insurance coverage is the Medicaid pro-
gram, which covers 11 percent of the non-elderly population; another 5
percent are covered by other sources of public insurance.
The final category is the uninsured.  There are over 43 million
uninsured, representing over 18 percent of the non-elderly population.
Despite expansions in the Medicaid program, this figure has grown sig-
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nificantly over the past decade because private insurance coverage has
declined more rapidly than Medicaid has grown.  It is this precipitous
decline in employer-provided insurance coverage that provides the
backdrop for thinking about new public efforts to cover the uninsured.
Who are the uninsured?  Their characteristics are explored in Table
2.  Almost 11 million of the uninsured are children.  Importantly, the
majority (almost 60 percent) of the uninsured are in families where the
head of the family is a full-time, full-year worker, and another quarter
are in families where there is part-time or part-year work.  This fact has
motivated continued efforts to increase insurance coverage through the
expansion of employer-provided insurance.  Interestingly, while the
uninsured are poorer than average, they are not all poor; almost 40 per-
cent of the uninsured have incomes over $30,000 per year.  At the same
time, the percentage of the income group that is uninsured falls sharply
with income, from 43 percent under $5,000 of income to only 8 percent
above $50,000 of income.
Why do we care if individuals are uninsured, more, say, than we
are concerned about individuals simply being poor?  Most directly,
public concern about the uninsured derives from consideration of







Total private coverage 162.8 75.9 167.5 70.9
Employment-based 148.5 69.2 151.7 64.2
Own 72.5 33.8 77.4 32.8
Dependent 75.9 35.4 74.3 31.5
Other private 14.3 6.7 15.8 6.7
Medicare 11.6 5.4 11.3 4.8
Medicaid 18.4 8.6 26.0 11.0
No health insurance 31.8 14.8 43.1 18.3
Total near-elderly 
population
214.4 100 236.2 100
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health insurance as a merit good, with intrinsic value beyond income.
There is a general assumption that it is important for individuals to
have insurance to maintain their health status.  However, many econo-
mists emphasize that medical care may actually be of limited relevance
for health, relative to the other behavioral and environmental factors
that affect the health of low-income persons.  So, an important and
open question is whether providing more insurance coverage would
actually improve the health of our population.
More indirectly, the uninsured impose real burdens, or “externali-
ties,” on those with insurance.  This can occur most directly through
communicable disease; if individuals without insurance forego vacci-
nations, for example, it can worsen the health of everyone.  It can also
occur indirectly, through financial channels.  For example, hospitals








Total 43.1 100 100
Child 10.7 24.9 15.0
Adult worker 24.6 57.0 18.2
Adult nonworker 7.8 18.1 26.2
Family head is full-time, full-year 25.7 59.5 14.6
Family head is part-time/part-year 10.5 24.4 29.7
Family head is nonworker 6.9 16.1 28.4
Family income
Under $5,000 5.0 11.6 42.8
    $5,000–$9,999 3.8 8.7 28.8
    $10,000–$14,999 5.4 12.4 37.0
    $15,000–$19,999 4.7 10.8 32.6
    $20,000–$29,999 7.7 17.9 26.6
    $30,000–$39,999 5.1 11.8 18.2
    $40,000–$49,999 3.7 8.5 14.4
    $50,000 + 7.8 18.2 7.8
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pay over $15 billion dollars per year in “uncompensated care,” prima-
rily to the uninsured, for which they receive no reimbursement.  Cover-
ing the uninsured would save these costs to the rest of society.
 Finally, and potentially most importantly in economic terms, the
prospect of becoming uninsured may have large productivity costs, as
individuals with insurance are afraid to leave their jobs for fear of los-
ing that insurance.  This “job lock” has been shown to be a quantita-
tively important phenomenon by economists, with estimates that
suggest that the fear of losing health insurance may lower mobility by
as much as 25 percent.  If individuals are locked into low-productivity
positions with health insurance, it is a real loss in the value of output
for the U.S. economy, and its financial implications may dwarf the $15
billion in uncompensated care noted above.  More complete insurance
coverage could alleviate this job lock.
MEDICAID POLICY
The primary public intervention in insurance markets for the non-
elderly in the United States is the Medicaid program.  At the outset, it
is important to highlight that Medicaid is a program that serves three
distinct populations: low-income women and children, the low-income
disabled, and the low-income elderly, particularly nursing home resi-
dents.  Spending is split roughly evenly between these three groups.  In
this chapter, I will focus on the first of these groups, women and chil-
dren, since I am concentrating on health insurance coverage, and the
elderly and the disabled are primarily covered by the Medicare pro-
gram for their medical expenditures.
Historically, Medicaid eligibility for women and children has been
tied to participation in the Aid for Families with Dependent Children
program (AFDC).  This linkage with AFDC restricted access to the
program to low-income single mothers, in some cases very low
income.  For example, the income cutoff for eligibility for a family of
four in South Carolina in 1984 was only 29 percent of the poverty line.
Beginning in 1984, and particularly after 1987, the program began to
expand eligibility for all children and pregnant women; that is, these
expansions applied only to the expenses of pregnancy for women.  By
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1992, states were required to cover all pregnant women and children
under the age of six up to 133 percent of poverty (independent of fam-
ily composition), and were allowed to expand coverage up to 185 per-
cent of poverty.  In addition, children born after September 30, 1983,
were mandatorily covered up to 100 percent of poverty (once again
independent of family composition). 
On top of these federal mandates was a host of state actions to
expand coverage, both at a faster pace and to a broader range of chil-
dren than is provided for by federal legislation.  For example, children
in Texas saw a 28 percentage-point increase in their eligibility for Med-
icaid between 1984 and 1992, while eligibility for children in Wiscon-
sin actually declined by 4 percent (Gruber 1997).
How Does Medicaid Affect Health?  
Ultimately, the question of interest for policymakers is how these
policy changes impacted the health of the low-income population, and
at what cost.  To understand the effects of Medicaid policy on health,
however, it is important to trace through the channels by which
changes at the legislative level are translated to actual health improve-
ments.
The process by which Medicaid determines health is depicted in
Figure 1.  The first step in evaluating the effect of Medicaid policy
changes on outcomes of interest, such as health, is to examine the
effects on the eligibility of persons for the Medicaid program.  The
next step is the translation of Medicaid eligibility into Medicaid cover-
age.  An important general feature of social insurance programs is that
individuals do not always take up the benefits for which they are eligi-
ble.  Previous research has found that only about two-thirds of those
eligible for the unemployment insurance, AFDC, and food stamps pro-
grams take up their benefits.2
The previously uninsured are not the only group that takes up ben-
efits, however.  In fact, two-thirds of those made eligible for the expan-
sions actually had private insurance already.  Some of those individuals
will find it attractive to drop that private insurance and join the Medic-
aid program.  Along some dimensions, Medicaid is a much more gen-
erous plan than most private policies, since it has no co-payments,
covers prescription drugs, and often covers optional services such as
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Figure 1 Medicaid Eligibility Policy
SOURCE: Gruber (2000).
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dental care.  In contrast, under the typical private insurance policy,
individuals pay one-third of their total medical costs out of pocket, in
the form of co-payments, deductibles, and premium-sharing.
Moreover, once covered by Medicaid, individuals will not auto-
matically increase their utilization of medical care.  Many physicians
do not treat publicly insured patients, possibly because public insur-
ance programs generally reimburse at rates far below private fee levels.
A number of observers have alleged that there is a shortfall in the sup-
ply of physicians willing to serve Medicaid patients.  The American
Medical Association (1991) reported that 26 percent of physicians
described themselves as “nonparticipants” in the Medicaid program,
and only 34 percent reported that they participated “fully” and were
accepting new Medicaid patients.  This problem is exacerbated by the
fact that many of the patients who would be made eligible for public
insurance are concentrated in areas that are underserved by physi-
cians.3
Finally, increases in the utilization of care will not necessarily
improve child health—for example, a number of studies suggest that
much of the acute care received by children is inappropriate and may
have little health benefit.  Kemper (1988), for example, found that 21
percent of pediatric hospitalization days were of “doubtful necessity,”
and that this percentage is higher for insured than for uninsured chil-
dren.  And, as noted above, the relevance of medical care for health is
not yet firmly established in many domains, particularly for children.
Whether or not increases in utilization improve health outcomes,
there is a definite link between increased utilization and increases in
Medicaid program costs.  Thus, the final step in assessing the efficacy
of Medicaid policy is to compare the costs of utilization increases to
any health benefits, to compute the cost-effectiveness of eligibility
increases.
What Have We Learned from the Medicaid Expansions?
As I have noted, Medicaid has expanded dramatically over the past
15 years, and it has done so at a very differential pace across the United
States.  This variation across the states has provided a “natural labora-
tory” for studying the impacts of Medicaid on insurance coverage,
health utilization, and health outcomes.  A large number of studies have
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examined the various links in Figure 1, with several important conclu-
sions.
First, the Medicaid expansions tremendously increased the eligibil-
ity of low-income women and children for health insurance coverage.
Figure 2 shows the growth in eligibility for health insurance coverage
under Medicaid for children and for pregnant women.   For both
groups, there is a gradual increase in eligibility from 1984 through
1987, and a much more rapid increase thereafter; these correspond to
the two eras denoted above.  By 1992, almost one-half of all women
were eligible for Medicaid for the expenses of pregnancy, and almost
one-third of children aged 0–14 were eligible for all of their medical
spending.
Second, the rate at which this new Medicaid eligibility was trans-
lated to new Medicaid coverage is quite low.  Estimates of the take-up
rate, or the increase in coverage among those made eligible, are
approximately 25 percent, suggesting that three-quarters of those made
eligible by the expansions did not take up coverage.  This fact is con-
firmed by Figure 3, which shows time-series data on coverage for chil-
dren and women of child-bearing age.  While both series rise steeply,
the increase is much less than that of eligibility; moreover, much of the
rise after 1989 is due to the recession, not eligibility policy.
Third, one reason for this low take-up is that two-thirds of those
made eligible for the expansions already had private health insurance
coverage.  The fact that such a large share of the newly eligible popula-
tion under the Medicaid expansions had access to private insurance
raises the prospect that many of the new enrollees on the program may
have been “crowded out” of private insurance purchases.  The time-
series evidence on insurance coverage in the United States would seem
to confirm the crowd-out hypothesis; there is a remarkable time-series
correlation between Medicaid coverage and private insurance coverage
over this period.
A number of careful econometric studies have considered the mag-
nitude of crowd-out, in terms of the change in private insurance cover-
age due to Medicaid policy, relative to the increase in the Medicaid
rolls.4  Virtually all of these studies have concluded that crowd-out is
significant, with estimates as high as 50 percent; that is, for every two


























Figure 2 Medicaid Eligibility of Women and Children
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Fourth, despite the fact that only some of those joining Medicaid
were formerly uninsured, there is a noticeable improvement in utiliza-
tion of health services.  Studies have found significant increases in uti-
lization of first trimester prenatal care by mothers who became eligible
for Medicaid, and in the utilization of preventive physician visits by
children who became eligible (Currie and Gruber 1996a,b).   For exam-
ple, Currie and Gruber found that children made eligible for Medicaid
saw a 50 percent reduction in the likelihood of going a full year with-
out a doctor’s visit.
Fifth, these increases in utilization were translated to improved
health.  The primary focus of studies in this area has been on mortality,
which is an easily measured and interpreted, albeit extreme, measure of
health.  Studies have found that the expansions of Medicaid led to an
8.5 percent decline in infant mortality, and a 5.1 percent decline in child
mortality (Currie and Gruber 1996a,b).  These are significant effects.
Finally, these expansions did significantly increase the costs of
the Medicaid program, as would be expected given increased enroll-
ment and utilization.  Given the impact on infant mortality, and the
associated increased costs, the expansions were associated with a cost
on the order of $2 million per life saved.  Is this figure large or small?
Relative to the promised cost savings by those who advocate in-
creased insurance and preventive care, this figure is quite large.  How-
ever, relative to either the economics literature on individual revela-
tions of the value of their life through choices (such as purchases of
safety equipment or taking risky jobs, which implies a value of $4–$7
million) or to the cost per life saved through other government pro-
grams (such as safety regulations for cars and busses, which can cost
upwards of $1 billion per life saved) this seems like a reasonable
investment.
POLICY DIRECTIONS
Given the failure of the Medicaid expansions to check the growth
of the uninsured in the United States, there is considerable interest in
alternative policy directions for expanding insurance coverage.  The
major attempted reform of recent years was the Health Security Act
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(HSA) initiative of the Clinton Administration in 1994, which pro-
posed through employer mandate and expanded public subsidies to
move toward universal coverage of the population.  In the wake of the
spectacular defeat of this effort, more incremental reforms have pro-
ceeded in recent years, at both the federal and state level.  In this sec-
tion, I will review alternative approaches to this problem, and consider
their pros and cons from a health economics perspective.
Guiding Principle: Efficiency
When thinking about policy alternatives, it is important to recog-
nize that any new spending on insurance expansions will be limited in
the current budgetary climate.  That makes it critical to focus on the
efficiency of new spending, or the bang-for-the-buck.  That is, for any
program, it is imperative to consider how many individuals will gain
insurance coverage on net, relative to the amount spent.  The crowd-out
discussion in the previous section points out that this is not a trivial
issue.  The more that public dollars are spent on populations that
already have insurance, the more that the take-up of these public pro-
grams is likely to be among those who already have insurance.
 At the same time, the bulk of the uninsured reside in working,
lower-middle income households, and the vast majority of these house-
holds do have health insurance.  So if serious inroads are to be made on
the uninsured, the issue of crowd-out cannot be avoided and must be
addressed head-on.  This suggests that policy be designed in a manner
that minimizes the appeal of any public subsidies to those who already
have health insurance, while still making the program attractive to
those who don’t.
Further Expansions of Public Insurance up the Income Scale
One straightforward alternative for increasing insurance coverage
is to continue to expand our public insurance safety net. This was the
approach taken by the recent Children’s Health Insurance Program
(CHIP), enacted by Congress as part of the Balanced Budget Act of
1997.  This program provides roughly $5 billion per year in matching
funds for states to expand health insurance coverage for children
beyond the eligibility provided for by existing Medicaid programs.
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States can use these funds to either expand the traditional Medicaid
program or to create a new program that meets certain criteria but is
more flexible than Medicaid along some dimensions.  For example,
under alternative programs there is more flexibility about the benefits
package covered and more freedom to charge premiums and co-pay-
ments to enrollees.  Initially, many states have focused on Medicaid
expansions, but more and more appear to be turning to alternative pro-
gram structures to circumvent some of the restrictions of the Medicaid
program.
The problem with this approach is that the CHIP program will be
spending its dollars primarily on those children around 200 percent of
poverty, a population that is already heavily privately insured.  For
example, among those children between 200 and 250 percent of pov-
erty, only 14 percent are uninsured and almost 80 percent already have
private health insurance.  This raises the prospect of significant crowd-
out with the CHIP expansions, and little new coverage as a result.
On the other hand, the flexibilities built into CHIP are likely to
help mitigate crowd-out.  By making the benefits package less gener-
ous than Medicaid, and by introducing premiums and co-payments for
services, state CHIP programs make it less attractive to drop one’s pri-
vate health insurance to join the public program.  Clearly, as public
insurance is expanded further and further up the income scale, given
the strong correlation between income and private insurance coverage,
more and more limitation of this form is called for.  
An important priority for research is to assess whether the flexibil-
ities in CHIP have a real impact on crowd-out.  Some causal evidence
suggests that they might.  Two states that introduced nontrivial premi-
ums into their Medicaid programs (Minnesota and Florida) have seen
relatively low levels of crowd-out, less than 10 percent in each case.
While this evidence is only suggestive, it does highlight the potential
importance of making the program less attractive as it is expanded up
the income scale.
Outreach
While expansions of insurance up the income scale seems an obvi-
ous way to reach more uninsured, the CHIP legislation largely ignored
a needier and more obvious population: those who are already eligible
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for Medicaid but don’t take it up.  Indeed, most estimates suggest that
there are on the order of four million children who are eligible for
Medicaid but don’t take up coverage.  Moreover, while most women
who are eligible for coverage of birthing expenses are signed up for
that coverage by hospitals, there is tremendous underuse of prenatal
care services by women who are eligible for Medicaid but don’t use it
to cover those services.  The reasons for this limited take-up are
unclear and reflect some mix of poor information about eligibility and
stigma about enrollment in a public insurance program.
Regardless of the cause, however, this is a very high bang-for-the-
buck population.  Of those children not on Medicaid already but with
incomes below 150 percent of the poverty line, 53 percent are unin-
sured.  This suggests that the highest priority for government policy is
to expand coverage of this group through outreach initiatives, even if
they are somewhat costly.  In other words, in thinking about expanding
insurance coverage in the low-income population, it is probably best to
think about filling the cup from the bottom: start by maximizing the
coverage of the lowest-income population with few other insurance
alternatives, and then move to higher-income groups that often have
access to private coverage.
Other Demographic Groups
For largely political reasons, the expansions of health insurance
through both Medicaid and CHIP have focused on children and preg-
nant women.  Yet there is little coherent argument for covering an 18-
year-old woman up to 200 percent of poverty, while a 19-year-old
woman receives no public coverage unless she is pregnant or on wel-
fare.  This is particularly true given the low use of prenatal care by
lower-income women; if they had continuous insurance coverage, they
would perhaps be more likely to seek care as soon as they got pregnant.  
One particularly helpful proposal that has been discussed is to
extend coverage to the parents of Medicaid and CHIP children.  This
would have the additional advantage of increasing take-up by the chil-
dren, because once the parents are eligible it might increase their
awareness of the entire family’s entitlement.
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Insurance Market Reforms
The problem with any public insurance expansion in today’s bud-
getary climate is that funding is likely to be extremely limited.  As a
result, much attention has been paid to insurance market reforms as a
means of expanding coverage.  The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) attempted to address one perceived cause
of uninsurance in the United States, which was practices of private
insurers that made the individual insurance market an unattractive
place to purchase insurance.  In particular, this bill mandated that pri-
vate insurers permit the conversion of group policies to individual cov-
erage, so that high-cost individuals who were leaving their jobs could
continue to access insurance.  It also set limits on the applicability of
preexisting conditions exclusions, and it guaranteed that small groups
who applied for insurance would be offered coverage.
In principle, these types of reforms are an alternative means of
expanding coverage with little public cost.  However, while the evi-
dence thus far is limited, it suggests that these reforms have had little
effect, primarily because insurers have an easy means of circumventing
these restrictions: raising prices, which are not federally regulated.
At the same time, a number of states have been passing similar and
often more expansive private insurance market regulations.  In addition
to the types of features noted above, states are experimenting with
price regulation that is designed to deal with the primary problem fac-
ing HIPAA, primarily for small firms and to a lesser extent for individ-
uals.  A number of states have mandated that prices stay within certain
bands, so that the highest-cost firm or individual cannot be charged
more than the lowest-cost firm or individual.  Some states have even
gone so far as to mandate community rating, whereby all firms or indi-
viduals in certain categories must be charged the same price.
The evidence on the impact of these state regulations is once again
limited.  But one recent provocative study suggests that these policies
have increased access for the most costly populations at the expense of
the least costly: insurance coverage has risen for older and higher-cost
workers but has fallen more for younger and lower-cost workers, for a
net reduction in insurance coverage.  This would be consistent with an
insurer reaction to these regulations of raising all premiums while mak-
ing them uniform, in order to ensure the profitability of insurance.
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Thus, the experience of both HIPAA and state regulations suggests
the substantial limits of insurance market reform as a mechanism for
expanding insurance coverage.  While the evidence thus far is limited,
there is certainly no suggestion that these reforms are dramatically, or
even modestly, increasing insurance coverage, and they may in fact be
having perverse effects on coverage.
Mandates
Another route of somewhat limited public intervention is targeted
mandates on employers, at a level much more modest than the major
mandates envisioned by the Health Security Act.  The most important
existing federal and state mandates on employers related to insurance
coverage are the “continuation of coverage” mandates that were passed
by a number of states starting in the 1970s, and then by the federal gov-
ernment in 1986.  These laws stipulate that employers must allow their
employees to continue to purchase insurance at group prices, which are
generally much lower than nongroup costs, for a period of time (18
months by federal law) after leaving a job.  This is a valuable benefit
for employees who are losing jobs or moving to new positions without
health insurance, as it allows them to tap into the much more efficient
group market rather than face the high prices and often discriminatory
practices of the individual insurance market.
A number of studies have suggested that these types of continua-
tion policies have been a success in raising insurance coverage signifi-
cantly among job leavers, particularly among those who don’t move
immediately into a new job with insurance.  These studies have found
that continuation coverage also had the collateral benefit of loosening
“job lock” by allowing individuals a source of modestly priced cover-
age when they wanted to move from low- to high-productivity posi-
tions.  Moreover, there is no evidence that these mandates have been
particularly onerous to employers; for example, there has been no
effect of the mandates on employers’ propensity to offer insurance.  
These studies suggest that there could be value in further extending
continuation coverage; for example, by subsidizing the costs of group
policies for those leaving their jobs, and by making this insurance
available for a longer period of time.
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Tax Policy
The final type of alternative to be considered is tax subsidies.  Cur-
rently, health insurance purchases are subsidized for two groups:
employees and the self-employed.  Employee costs are subsidized
through the exclusion of employer-paid health insurance premiums
(and some employee-paid premiums as well) from an individual’s tax-
able income.  This subsidy is currently estimated to cost over $100 bil-
lion per year in foregone revenues to the federal government (Sheils
and Hogan 1999).   The costs of the self-employed have been partially
subsidized since 1986; currently 60 percent of the health insurance
costs of the self-employed can be deducted from taxable income, and
this share will rise to 100 percent by 2003 (Meyer, Silow-Carroll, and
Wicks 1999). 
This system of tax subsidies leaves three groups without tax subsi-
dies for the purchase of health insurance:
• those who work for firms that do not offer health insurance,   
• those who are not employees nor self-employed, such as the
unemployed or early retirees (before the age of Medicare eligibil-
ity), and 
• those who work for firms that do not offer a Section 125 plan
(i.e., a “cafeteria plan”) that allows employees to contribute the
employees’ share of health insurance premiums on a pretax basis. 
Each of these holes represents a significant population.  Roughly
15 percent of the non-elderly population is at a point in time not eligi-
ble for a tax subsidy to health insurance, and roughly 21 percent of
insurance spending among those who are insured is not tax subsidized.5
As a result, a string of recent proposals have considered expanding
in one way or another the tax deductibility of health insurance.  In its
most ambitious form, some of these proposals would end the employer
tax exclusion and introduce unlimited individual tax exclusions in its
place.  However, most of the proposed legislation in this area has sug-
gested more limited (although still potentially quite costly) interven-
tions, usually in the form of limited credits or deductions toward the
purchase of health insurance.  Even within this framework, however,
there is considerable variation in the details of the policies proposed,
along dimensions such as the generosity of the credit, the income
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ranges to which it would apply, and the potential pool of people eligi-
ble.
I have built a detailed simulation model to analyze the impact of
tax policy alternatives (Gruber 2000), and there are two important les-
sons from this analysis for using tax policy to cover the uninsured.
First, even expansive tax policies cannot cover a very sizeable fraction
of the uninsured.  For example, I estimate that a policy that provided a
$2,000 credit for single persons and a $4,000 credit for families for the
purchase of nongroup insurance will cost almost $35 billion dollars per
year, a sum that almost certainly exceeds congressional willingness to
spend money to address this issue but would cover only about 5.5 mil-
lion uninsured, or less than one-seventh of the uninsured population.
Second, there is an inverse relationship between the generosity of
policies and their efficiency.  For example, a credit that is one-quarter
as generous as that described above would cost only $1.4 billion per
year, and would cover almost one million uninsured.  This is a cost of
only $1,550 per person who gains insurance, compared to a cost of
over $6,200 per person who gains insurance with the more expansive
credit.  This is because as the credit is made more generous, targeting is
worse.  More generous credits are taken up extensively by both those
who already have nongroup insurance, so that we are just paying their
costs, or those who have group insurance and are paying some costs,
and so would rather switch to highly subsidized nongroup insurance (a
crowd-out-type effect).  Thus, we see the same problem that we saw
with public insurance expansions: as policy attempts to get more gen-
erous, it faces larger crowd-out problems and declining efficiency of
public spending.
CONCLUSIONS—WHERE DO WE GO?
The sizeable growth of the uninsured population in the face of the
robust economy of the past six years is striking and disturbing.  It sug-
gests that we cannot count on standard economic forces to simply solve
this problem, and that serious reductions in the number of uninsured
may require more dramatic government intervention.  The experience
of the Medicaid expansions suggests that government intervention can
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work to improve the health of low-income populations, but that as this
intervention is expanded farther, the cost of further reductions in the
uninsured population may be quite steep.
It seems clear that the first policies the government should pursue
are bottom-of-the-cup policies that target those groups which generally
have little other recourse to insurance.  One clear group in this category
is the up to seven million children currently eligible for, but not
enrolled in, public insurance.  Another such group may be very low-
income adults who have been excluded from the dramatic increases in
insurance eligibility of the past decade and a half.  These are groups
that are primarily uninsured and for which the bang-for-the-buck
would be highest for new government health insurance expenditures.
Beyond this, society must recognize the high costs of additional
reductions in the number of uninsured.  These costs can be minimized
through public insurance expansions, which are relatively unattractive
to those with private insurance today, such as by adding premiums or
restricting benefits.  Tax policy remains a viable option, but it is diffi-
cult to design a tax policy that has a very large impact at a modest cost.
Tax subsidies are likely to be most useful as part of a larger package,
rather than as a stand-alone solution.
In conclusion, the economics profession has a lot to add to the
debate over health insurance coverage.  We have provided clear evi-
dence that health insurance coverage expansions can improve health,
but that costs can be high due to insurance crowd-out.  And economic
principles of efficiency deliver a quite clear message for the first priori-
ties for new public spending on health insurance coverage: start with
the groups that are most in need of insurance coverage.  If policymak-
ers heed these lessons, we can efficiently move toward reducing the
burden of uninsurance in the United States today.
Notes
1. Data on Medicaid spending from U.S. Congress Committee on Ways and Means
(1998); data on insurance coverage from Employee Benefit Research Institute
(1999).
2. Blank and Card (1991) estimated that takeup of unemployment insurance benefits
only about two-thirds, and Blank and Ruggles (1996) estimated similar takeup for
AFDC and food stamps.
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3. For example, Fossett et al. (1992) compared Chicago neighborhoods with 50 per-
cent of the population on welfare to neighborhoods with 10 percent of the popula-
tion on welfare and found that there were twice as many physicians practicing in
the wealthier areas (on a per child basis).
4. See, for example, Cutler and Gruber (1996) Dubay and Kenney (1997), Blum-
berg, Dubay, and Norton (2000), and Rask and Rask (2000).
5. Author’s tabulations from the March 1997 Current Population Survey.
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